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Abstract
The MPEG-21 Intellectual Property Management and
Protection (“IPMP”) Components specify a framework
for inter-operable and renewable digital rights manage-
ment based on IPMP tools that implement proprietary
digital rights management features. MPEG-21 defines the
mechanism by which protected multimedia objects are as-
sociated with proprietary IPMP tools, but does not spec-
ify the interface through which IPMP tools and MPEG-21
terminals communicate.
This paper describes an implementation of the IPMP
components including an interface to IPMP tools based
on the MPEG Rights Expression Language; dynamic con-
struction of authorisation proofs that permit a principal
to carry out an action; and a cryptographic architecture
bound to the existence of authorisation proofs. This im-
plementation has been applied to scenarios in copyright
protection, privacy protection and corporate document
protection, suggesting that “IPMP” may be useful in ap-
plications other than intellectual property.
1 Introduction
The increasing availability of network technologies has
made electronic distribution an attractive mode of distri-
∗ c©ACM, 2007. This is the author’s version of the work.
It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal
use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was pub-
lished in the ACM Workshop on Digital Rights Management 2007,
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1314276.1314280.
bution for valuable multimedia works, private data and
sensitive corporate information. The owners of valuable
and important information, however, rarely want this in-
formation to be distributed and used without limit.
Digital rights management allows information owners
to control and monitor the distribution of files through
electronic channels. Digital rights management technol-
ogy has become well-known for its role in copyright pro-
tection for Internet music and video services, but is also
becoming important in the protection of sensitive corpo-
rate information [1] and is emerging as a technology for
protecting individuals’ private information [22].
The MPEG-21 Multimedia Framework [14] seeks to
define a generic framework for storing, distributing and
using multimedia presentations. It is intended to provide
standards for structuring collections of multimedia works,
and managing and reporting on uses of these collections.
We will give an overview of the MPEG-21 Multimedia
Framework in Section 3.
Rights management is a core feature of MPEG-21.
Part 4 of the specification proposes a framework for inter-
operable digital rights management centred on the notion
of IPMP tools that are provided by the vendors of pro-
prietary digital rights management systems, and Part 5 of
the specification proposes a rights expression language to
be used for writing licences that govern the use of multi-
media works. Part 6 also defines a rights data dictionary
for describing rights-managed scenarios, which is not ad-
dressed in the present paper.
In this paper, we describe our experiences in imple-
menting a digital rights management system based on
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the MPEG-21 IPMP Components. Our system, known
as Smart Internet Technology Digital Rights Manage-
ment (“SITDRM”), was developed at the Co-operative
Research Centre for Smart Internet Technology in Aus-
tralia, and has been applied to applications in copyright
protection, privacy protection and enterprise DRM.
MPEG-21 leaves the form and scope of an IPMP tool
largely undefined, stating simply that an IPMP tool “can
be a single protection module, for example, a single de-
cryption tool, and can also be a collection of tools, i.e.
a complete IPMP system.” Section 4 of the present pa-
per describes the IPMP engine implemented by our digi-
tal rights management system, including an interface for
IPMP tools based on the structure of the MPEG Rights
Expression Language.
Section 5 describes our approach to distributing and lo-
cating licences and cryptographic keys required to access
resources that have been protected using IPMP tools. In
common with other digital rights management systems,
our approach binds the possession of cryptographic keys
to the possession of an authorisation proof (set of li-
cences) that permits an action that requires those keys.
In our system, terminals are able to build an authorisation
proof dynamically at the time an authorisation request is
made rather than require an information owner to supply
a fixed authorisation proof at the time protected resources
are created.
Section 6 outlines the applications to which we have
applied SITDRM, and describes the particular security ar-
chitecture and IPMP tools that we used in our applica-
tions.
Finally, we discuss some of the observations we made
in implementing the IPMP Components in Section 7.
While some aspects of the MPEG-21 specification seem
problematic, we were able to construct a digital rights
management framework that could be applied to a vari-
ety of scenarios beyond the intellectual property scenarios
contemplated by MPEG. Our system could be improved,
however, by more efficient construction of authorisation
proofs and an infrastructure for distributing IPMP tools.
2 Related Work
Many digital rights management systems have been de-
veloped and numerous proprietary systems are currently
on the market. The lack of inter-operability between digi-
tal rights management schemes, however, is a well-known
barrier to popular acceptance of digital rights manage-
ment.
Several specification bodies have attempted to address
inter-operability by proposing specifications for either
self-contained digital rights management regimes [27,
26], or frameworks for exchanging rights-managed infor-
mation between different regimes [6]. MPEG-21’s IPMP
Components [16] – and the related specification released
by the Digital Media Project [9] – take a “configuration-
driven” approach [23] in which critical rights manage-
ment functionality is left to the developers of proprietary
plug-ins called “IPMP tools”. IPMP tools have an ad-
ditional advantage in that they provide for renewability
of digital rights management components that have been
compromised or othwerwise made obsolete. This paper
focuses on the latter approach.
2.1 MPEG-21
Though reference implementations of other parts of the
MPEG-21 Framework are available [18], no reference im-
plementation is currently available for the IPMP Compo-
nents and in this paper we describe an implementation that
has been made independently of MPEG.
Brox [3] and Karpouzis, et al. [21] note the value of in-
cluding the digital rights management features of MPEG-
21 into platforms for health records and sports broadcast-
ing, respectively, but neither describe an actual implemen-
tation of the IPMP Components used in their systems.
Suen [34] has implemented an MPEG REL evaluator
based on an expert system. Suen’s parser views a set of
MPEG REL licences as a set of predicates, and a request
to perform an action as a hypothesis. If the expert sys-
tem determines that the hypothesis is true given the set
of predicates, the action is permitted. We will consider
the relationship between Suen’s evaluator and ours in Sec-
tion 5. Other MPEG REL evaluators are available [18, 5]
but we do not know how they are designed.
2.2 MPEG-4
Like MPEG-21, MPEG-4 employs the notion of IPMP
tools in order to provide inter-operability and renewability
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for digital rights management systems. Also like MPEG-
21, the original version of MPEG-4 IPMP did not specify
the interface to IPMP tools and IPMP tool implementa-
tions, e.g. [13], depended on the interface defined by a
particular MPEG-4 player.
MPEG recognised that this approach had drawbacks
in that tools had to be re-written for every player, and
proposed the IPMP Extensions to remedy this [20]. The
IPMP Extensions define a message-passing interface be-
tween terminals and tools so that any tool can commu-
nicate with any terminal. Implementations of the IPMP
Extensions are described by Fan, et al. [11] and Serrão, et
al. [31].
While a message-passing interface has a number of ad-
vantages, we chose to use a functional interface for our
tools as it is considerably easier to implement. Our inter-
face could be adapted to a message-passing one but this is
left as future work.
2.3 The Digital Media Project
The Digital Media Project was established in 2003 with
a vision to promote widespread use of digital media and,
in particular, an inter-operable digital rights management
regime. At the time of writing, the Digital Media Project
had just released Version 2.1 of its specification for an
inter-operable digital rights management platform [7].
This specification adopts MPEG-21’s Digital Item Dec-
laration Language and IPMP Components, together with
MPEG-4’s IPMP Extensions for defining an interface for
IPMP tools (called “DRM tools” by the Digital Media
Project).
The Digital Media Project is working on reference soft-
ware that implements its specification, known as “Chill-
out” [8]. No formal release had been made at the time of
writing, though some source code was available from the
Digital Media Project’s version control system, and some
incomplete documentation became available at around the
same time this paper was written.
There are necessarily a number of similarities between
Chillout and SITDRM since they are implementing very
similar specifications. SITDRM’s approach to IPMP
tools, however, is quite different to that used in the Digital
Media Project in that IPMP tools in SITDRM are bound to
the intepretation and enforcement of licences, while DRM
tools in Chillout are focused on the protection of multime-
dia files.
2.4 Other Systems
The conditional access community has proposed
configuration-driven systems apart from those espoused
by MPEG, such as the Open Platform Initiative for
Multimedia Access (“OPIMA”) [28, 31]. Compared to
the Digital Media Project, OPIMA’s approach to IPMP
tools is at the opposite end of MPEG-21’s spectrum
of IPMP tools in that OPIMA’s “IPMP Systems” are
complete digital rights management or conditional access
systems in their own right. SITDRM, on the other hand,
views tools as a means of implementing a particular
system based on the MPEG Rights Expression Language.
On a theoretical level, SITDRM’s approach bears some
resemblance to aspects of the “layered” approach to dig-
ital rights management proposed by Jamkhedkar and
Heileman [19, 12]. Jamkhedkar and Heileman have the
REL interpreter situated in a “rights expression and inter-
pretation layer” that calls upon a “digital rights enforce-
ment upper layer” to perform cryptographic operations.
SITDRM provides a concrete example of this kind of ar-
chitecture in which the digital rights enforcement upper
layer is populated by IPMP tools, though some functions
of SITDRM’s tools might also fall into the rights expres-
sion and interpretation layer in Jamkhedkar and Heile-
man’s model.
3 MPEG-21
Unlike previous MPEG standards, MPEG-21 does not de-
fine the way in which individual multimedia presentations
are encoded, but defines ways in which atomic multime-
dia objects can be combined, navigated and referenced.
It consists of numerous parts ratified by the International
Standards Organisation as the ISO/IEC 21000 series of
standards.
This section gives a brief description of the components
of MPEG-21 required to understand this paper. Sections 4
and 5 give further details about our interpretation of and
extensions to the MPEG-21 Framework.
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<didl:DIDL>
<didl:Item>
<didl:Component>
<didl:Descriptor>
<didl:Statement>
<dii:Identifier>
urn:org:doc:1
</dii:Identifier>
</didl:Statement>
</didl:Descriptor>
<didl:Resource>
<myxml:MyXML>...</myxml:MyXML>
</didl:Resource>
</didl:Component>
</didl:Item>
</didl:DIDL>
Figure 1: A simple digital item declaration.
3.1 Digital Items
The core notion in MPEG-21 is the notion of a digital item
[15], which represents a collection of multimedia objects
related in some way. Digital items are described using the
XML-based digital item declaration language (“DIDL”),
which organises content and meta-data into a hierarchical
structure. The most important elements for understanding
this paper are:
Resources. Atomic multimedia objects such as images,
sounds and videos.
Descriptors. Elements containing meta-data about a re-
source, such as identifiers, abstracts, MPEG-7 de-
scriptors and so on.
Components. Resources together with their descriptors.
Items. Complex multimedia objects, made up of sub-
items and/or components.
Figure 1 shows a simple digital item declaration, con-
sisting of a single item containing a single component.
The resource is an XML document contained by the
MyXML tags (the body of the document has been omit-
ted for brevity), and is identified by the URN urn:org:
doc:1.
3.2 Intellectual Property Management and
Protection
Intellectual property management and protection
(“IPMP”) is MPEG’s term for digital rights management
[16]. MPEG-21 does not fix a particular digital rights
management system, but assumes that IPMP functionality
is provided by vendor-specific IPMP tools that can be
downloaded and made accessible to the terminal as
necessary. IPMP tools may implement basic functions
such as decryption and watermarking, or may implement
complete digital rights management systems in their own
right.
We say an element is governed if it is protected by one
or more IPMP tools. Governed portions of a digital item
are expressed in the IPMP Digital Item Declaration Lan-
guage (“IPMP DIDL”). IPMP DIDL has the same struc-
ture as DIDL, but associates each element with a plaintext
identifier and an IPMP information descriptor that asso-
ciates the resource with a licence and identifies the IPMP
tools required to access the element, as shown in Figure 2.
In this paper, elements of the IPMP DIDL namespace are
distinguished from their equivalents in the DIDL names-
pace using the namespace prefix ipmpdidl.
MPEG-21 does little to define the scope and form
of IPMP tools. In particular, MPEG-21 does not de-
fine a programming or communications interface between
MPEG-21 terminals and IPMP tools, and it is unclear how
IPMP tool implementors could construct tools to work
with any MPEG-21 implementation.
For our implementation, we developed an interface
based on a DIDL parser (itself based on the Document
Object Model for XML documents [37]) and the MPEG
Rights Expression Language. Our interface is described
in Section 4 of the present paper, and the specifics of the
IPMP tools that we implemented are described in Sec-
tion 6.
3.3 Rights Expression Language
Though MPEG-21 does not define a full digital rights
management system, it does define a rights expression
language known as “MPEG REL” [17]. MPEG REL is
closely based on the Extensible Rights Markup Language
(“XrML”) [4].
An MPEG REL licence is structured as a collection of
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<didl:DIDL>
<didl:Item>
<didl:Component>
<ipmpdidl:Resource>
<ipmpdidl:Identifier>
<dii:Identifier>
urn:org:doc:1
</dii:Identifier>
</ipmpdidl:Identifier>
<ipmpdidl:Info>
<ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
...
</ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
</ipmpdidl:Info>
<ipmpdidl:Contents>
<xenc:EncryptedData>
...
</xenc:EncryptedData>
</ipmpdidl:Contents>
</ipmpdidl:Resource>
</didl:Component>
</didl:Item>
</didl:DIDL>
Figure 2: A governed version of the digital item shown in
Figure 1.
grants issued by some licence issuer. Each grant awards
some right over some specified resource to a specified
principal, that is, user of a resource. Each grant may be
subject to a condition, such that the right contained in the
grant may not be exercised unless the condition is satis-
fied.
Each of the four components of an MPEG REL grant is
associated with an abstract XML schema type. In any ac-
tual licence, each of these abstract types must be instanti-
ated by a concrete type representing a particular principal,
right, resource or condition.
In order to perform some action on a resource, a user
(principal) must possess a licence containing a grant that
awards the right to perform that action on that resource,
and satisfy the associated condition. The terminal must
check this before exercising the right.
MPEG REL is defined as a collection of three XML
schemata, called the core schema (denoted by the XML
namespace prefix r in this paper), the standard extension
schema (prefix sx) and the multimedia extension schema
(prefix mx). These schemata define the fundamental el-
ements of the language, some widely-useful conditions,
and elements useful in copyright protection applications,
respectively.
Figure 3 shows an example of an MPEG REL grant
allowing a principal (r:keyHolder) identified by his or
her public key to print a resource (mx:diReference)
identified by a digital item identifier urn:org:doc:1.
The principal is only permitted to print the resource once
(sx:ExerciseLimit).
A number of the principals and conditions defined by
MPEG REL, such as the PropertyPossessor prin-
cipal and PrerequisiteRight condition, depend on
the existence of other grants to be authorised. Thus a se-
ries of grants known as an authorisation proof may be re-
quired to authorise a single action. Authorisation proofs
play an important role in the SITDRM system and will be
discussed further in Section 5.
4 An MPEG-21 IPMP Engine
ISO/IEC 21000-4 leaves the scope and form of IPMP
tools almost entirely undefined. We suppose that IPMP
tools are intended to perform the functions performed by
the “navigation” and “resource access” tools in this paper,
5
<r:grant>
<r:keyHolder>
<r:info>
<dsig:KeyValue>
<dsig:RSAKeyValue>
...
</dsig:RSAKeyValue>
</dsig:KeyValue>
</r:info>
</r:keyHolder>
<mx:print/>
<mx:diReference>
<mx:identifier>
urn:org:doc:1
</mx:identifier>
</mx:diReference>
<sx:ExerciseLimit>
<sx:count>1</sx:count>
</sx:ExerciseLimit>
<r:grant>
Figure 3: An MPEG REL grant.
much like the Digital Media Project, but ISO/IEC 21000-
4 does not specify any interface through which the termi-
nal and tools communicate in order to achieve this.
SITDRM’s approach to configuring the terminal’s
IPMP capabilities is derived from the typing structures
of IPMP DIDL and MPEG REL. Navigation tools pro-
vide an implementation of digital item elements from
the IPMP DIDL namespace, while rights enforcement
tools provide implementations of the principals, rights, re-
sources and conditions of an MPEG REL grant.
The general idea is that each element of IPMP DIDL
and MPEG REL be associated with a tool that is respon-
sible for parsing that element and presenting a standard
interface to the DIDL and REL parsers, respectively, such
that the parsers and IPMP engine can interact with the el-
ements without needing to understand the elements them-
selves. The particular interfaces for each kind of tool will
be described later in this section.
The vendor of any particular IPMP system is responsi-
ble for providing tools that implement all of the elements
used in digital items and licences supported by that ven-
dor.
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Figure 4: Performing a governed action with IPDoc. The
dashed line shows the boundary of the terminal.
4.1 Terminal Architecture
Figure 4 shows the architecture of our MPEG-21 termi-
nal, known as “IPDoc”. Throughout this paper, we as-
sume that IPDoc is executing in a trusted, tamper-resistant
environment such that any secret information obtained
by IPDoc cannot be accessed outside the IPDoc process;
we will give more detail about our environment in Sec-
tion 6.1.
IPDoc is written in Java, and the user interacts with the
software via a document window that allows him or her
to navigate a digital item and perform actions upon its
resources, such as “play”, “print”, etc.
When the user attempts to perform an action on a gov-
erned resource, the document window creates an “actor”
(that is, a Java object that will carry out that action) as well
as a “governed actor” that acts as a bridge between the real
actor and the IPMP engine. The governed actor is a pro-
gramming convenience that allows the document window
to perform both governed and ungoverned actions using
the same interface.
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The governed actor instantiates the IPMP engine and
supplies it with the IPMP information descriptor associ-
ated with the resource by its digital item. This information
must include a list of licence element builders that are able
to parse each element of the licence and to construct IPMP
tools that enforce the licence elements that they represent.
Vendors must implement a builder, element representa-
tion and IPMP tool for every kind of principal, condition,
resource and right they support.
The IPMP engine attempts to find a set of licences that
permit the action being requested, as described in detail in
Section 5. If successful, the engine instantiates the prin-
cipal validation and condition validation tools required to
enforce those licences. Finally, if the validation tools per-
mit the action to proceed, the output of the navigation and
resource access tools is connected to the input of the real
actor, and the actor’s output is sent back to the document
window.
4.2 IPMP Descriptors
Every governed element must contain an IPMP informa-
tion descriptor that identifies the IPMP tools required for
accessing the content of the element. In SITDRM, IPMP
tools are identified by their Java class names, and an IPMP
descriptor must contain the Java class names of all of the
tool builders required to parse a licence for the associated
digital item element, as shown in Figure 5.
As MPEG REL supports a very large number of ele-
ments, listing a builder for every possible element in an
IPMP information descriptor could become very cumber-
some. For this reason, it is possible to define a “super-
builder” able to construct many different tools. We imag-
ine that particular vendors might support a specific set of
tools for which they could issue a single super-builder.
4.3 IPMP Tools
In SITDRM, IPMP tools are Java classes that can be
loaded using the usual Java class loader. Every tool must
implement an interface through which the IPMP engine
communicates with the tool. We will describe the in-
terface for each kind of tool informally in this section.
The formal definitions for each interface are given in Ap-
pendix A.
<ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
<!-- rights enforcement tool builder -->
<ipmpinfo:Tool>
<ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
<ipmpinfo:ToolID>
au.com.smartinternet.drm.impl.
SitLicenseElementBuilder
</ipmpinfo:ToolID>
</ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
</ipmpinfo:Tool>
<!-- XML encryption tool builder -->
<ipmpinfo:Tool>
<ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
<ipmpinfo:ToolID>
au.com.smartinternet.drm.impl.
navigation.SitXmlEncryptionBuilder
</ipmpinfo:ToolID>
</ipmpinfo:ToolBaseDescription>
</ipmpinfo:Tool>
</ipmpinfo:IPMPInfoDescriptor>
Figure 5: An IPMP information descriptor. The Sit-
LicenseElementBuilder class is a “super-builder”
able to build any of the rights enforcement tools used in
our applications.
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Since both the terminal and the IPMP tools have ac-
cess to secret information, and, in general, exist inside
distinct boundaries of trust, it is necessary for the termi-
nal and tools to perform mutual authentication before they
can safely co-operate with each other. We have not yet
implemented mutual authentication in SITDRM, but we
assume that the vendors of both terminals and IPMP tools
provide certificates for their software by which mutual au-
thentication can be performed. We will discuss this issue
further in Section 7.4.1.
4.3.1 The IPMP Tool Listener
The IPMP engine implements an IPMP tool listener in-
terface through which IPMP tools can interact with the
engine, the terminal and the user. The listener interface
provides methods that allow tools to
• send cryptographic challenges to the terminal and
user;
• obtain information about the action that they are be-
ing used to perform;
• display messages to the user and get input from the
user; and
• access functions of the IPMP engine to obtain au-
thorisation and cryptographic keys, as described in
Section 5.
4.3.2 IPMP Navigation Tools
SITDRM’s DIDL parser implements an interface for dig-
ital item elements closely based on the Node interface
of the Document Object Model [37]. This interface pro-
vides methods to retrieve and manipulate the children and
siblings of an element. The interface is implemented in-
ternally for ungoverned digital item elements, but not for
governed elements.
The interface for a governed element must be imple-
mented by an IPMP navigation tool. Once the IPMP en-
gine has determined that access to a governed element
is permitted, it initialises the navigation tool with cryp-
tographic information extracted from the licence as de-
scribed in Section 5.3. The tool then provides a Node-
like interface to the DIDL parser identical to that for an
ungoverned item.
4.3.3 Principal Validation Tools
Principal validation tools implement a single method that
is called by the IPMP engine in order to check that the
current human user of the terminal is, in fact, the princi-
pal referred to by a grant. Every implementation of the
MPEG REL Principal type must be associated with
a principal validation tool that is able to authenticate this
kind of principal.
4.3.4 Condition Validation Tools
Condition validation tools implement an interface that al-
lows the IPMP engine to
• check whether or not the corresponding condition is
true;
• be notified if the condition subsequently ceases to be
true; and
• update stored state information for stateful condi-
tions such as ExerciseLimit and TrackRe-
port.
Every implementation of the MPEG REL Condition
type must be associated with a condition validation tool
able to perform all of the above functions.
4.3.5 Resource Access Tools
Resource access tools act as a filter between a governed
resource and the renderer for that resource. When sup-
plied with the resource key for a governed resource, they
provide an implementation of Java’s InputStream in-
terface that allows the renderer to access the governed re-
source as if it were unencrypted. Every implementation
of the MPEG REL Resource type must be associated
with a resource access tool.
Our interface assumes that the resources of a digital
item are simple atomic objects such as JPEG images, text
documents or raw data. A more sophisticated interface
may be required if resources are permitted to be complex
multimedia items in their own right, such as MPEG-4 files
in which individual tracks may encrypted using indepen-
dent keys and some header information may not be en-
crypted at all.
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4.3.6 Rights Tools?
SITDRM uses rights builders to parse instances of the
MPEG REL Right type as for the other types, but we
have not (yet) found any role for “rights tools” in enforc-
ing a licence. When a user wishes to exercise a particular
right, the terminal simply passes the name of the right to
the IPMP engine, which checks that a licence granting
that right exists. It is up to the terminal to ensure that the
action it takes conforms to the definition of the right.
5 Licences
The MPEG-21 IPMP Components define an element
called RightsDescriptor for including licences
within the IPMP information descriptor of a governed dig-
ital item. The rights descriptor may contain an in-line li-
cence; a reference to an external licence; or a reference to
a web service that will supply a licence.
Associating a governed item with a fixed set of in-line
or external licences, however, does not work very well in
the scenarios for which we developed SITDRM. In our
scenarios, the creator of a governed item does not neces-
sarily know which licences will be used in order to access
that item. In a super-distribution scenario, for example,
a governed item might be passed around amongst a col-
lection of friends, each of whom must apply to a licence
issuer for his or her own individual licence to use the item.
Rather than rely on rights descriptors, SITDRM’s
IPMP engine attempts to build a dynamic authorisation
proof at the time permission is request to perform an
action. The authorisation proof is built using a com-
bination of licences taken from some logical pool of
licences, which may consist of one or more physical
databases. In general, “databases” may include the con-
tents of RightsDescriptor elements, though this has
not yet been implemented in SITDRM.
An alternative approach – arguably more consistent
with the intention of MPEG-21 – might be to specify a
licence service for a governed item within its rights de-
scriptor, and have that service build an authorisation proof
from a pool of licences using the procedure described in
this section. We found it more convenient, however, to
allow the IPMP engine to build proofs directly by con-
sulting whichever licence databases it had access to.
5.1 Authorisation Proofs
Formally, an MPEG REL authorisation request consists
of a principal, a right and a resource together with the
context information required to make an authorisation de-
cision. An authorisation request will be accepted only if
there is an authorisation proof for that principal, right and
resource.
An authorisation proof is a properly-authorised autho-
risation story. An authorisation story consists of
• a primitive grant with principal, right and resource
corresponding to an authorisation request;
• a grant or grant group from which the first grant can
be derived (that is, obtained by reasoning in the ob-
vious way); and
• optionally, an authoriser who has authorised the
grant group.
An authorisation proof is therefore an authorisation story
in which the first grant is correctly derived from the grant
group, and the grant group is itself correctly authorised by
the authoriser.
If an authorisation story does not contain an authoriser,
the grant group must be derived from a set of root grants
in order to be valid. The root grants are a set of grants that
have been defined to be authorised for a specific applica-
tion. A typical root grant, for example, might grant the
system’s licence issuer the right to issue licences.
SITDRM does not use authorisers in authorisation
proofs. SITDRM’s root grants allow any principal to issue
licences concerning resources owned by that principal. It
is not necessary to check root grants explicitly, however:
since only the true owner of a resource possesses the re-
source key for that resource, only that owner can produce
licences containing the valid resource key as described in
Section 5.3.
5.2 Forming Authorisation Proofs
Obviously it would be infeasible for the enforcement en-
gine to try every possible combination of licences in the
pool to check whether or not that combination forms an
authorisation proof for a particular request.
SITDRM’s IPMP engine attempts to construct an au-
thorisation proof using a depth-first search of the licences
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Figure 6: Constructing an authorisation proof.
in the pool, as shown in Figure 6. When it receives an
authorisation request, it first searches the pool for a grant
that might authorise that request. If the grant has been
correctly signed by its issuer, it instantiates all of the prin-
cipal validation and condition validation tools required to
enforce that grant.
If a tool represents a principal or condition that de-
pends on another grant in order to be authorised (e.g. the
PropertyPossessor principal validation tool), the
tool asks the IPMP engine to locate this grant. The cycle
continues until either a valid authorisation proof is found,
or the IPMP engine cannot find a grant required by one of
the IPMP tools and the authorisation request is denied.
SITDRM searches for grants using relational database
queries. Every grant is represented by a three-tuple
(Principal, Right, Resource) in a database table.
Given an authorisation request, the IPMP engine searches
the database table for grants that might satisfy that request
in the obvious way. Note that, since the logical licence
pool may be distributed over several physical databases,
it may be necessary to execute the query on several differ-
ent databases and aggregate the results.
Other authors have proposed the use of inference en-
gines to generate authorisation proofs [34] or “proof-
carrying authorisations” [2]. In these systems, grants
(equivalently, “facts” in proof-carrying authorisations) are
represented as statements in some logic and an authori-
sation request is viewed as a theorem to be proved us-
ing those statements. These representations are arguably
more elegant than ours. The general idea, however, is
much the same: at each step of building an authorisation
proof, the engine examines a claim and proceeds by at-
tempting to prove all of the claims on which the current
claim depends.
5.2.1 Multiple Authorisation Proofs
It may happen that there exists more than one valid au-
thorisation proof for a given authorisation request. This
does not matter if authorisation proofs are stateless, and
the inference engines described above do not appear to
consider the possibility that there might be a need to dis-
tinguish between multiple valid authorisation proofs.
Digital rights management systems, however, make fre-
quent use of stateful conditions. Suppose, for example, a
user possesses two licences for the same item: one that al-
lows him or her to use it on a pay-per-view basis, and an-
other that requires him or her to have a subscription. In or-
der to maintain the state information associated with these
licences correctly, we need to take care which grants are
exercised even though both imply authorisation to view
the item.
Whenever SITDRM’s IPMP engine finds two or more
grants that might authorise a request, it instructs the termi-
nal to ask the user to select which grant he or she wishes
to exercise. In the above example, the user would be pre-
sented with a choice to pay for a single view of the item,
or to take out a subscription which would remain valid for
future views of the item.
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5.3 Conveying Cryptographic Keys
MPEG-21 does not consider how terminals obtain the
cryptographic information required to access governed re-
sources – obtaining this information is presumably the re-
sponsibility of IPMP tools.
In most digital rights management systems, however,
the distribution of cryptographic information is tightly
bound to the distribution of licences: all of the OMA
DRM, Marlin and Digital Media Project specifications,
for example, have resource keys being distributed inside
licences or equivalent objects. The philosophy here (we
assume) is that a resource key is of no use unless there is
a licence to authorise its use, and a licence is of no use
without a resource key to make its execution possible.
SITDRM adopts this approach so that access to keys
is tightly bound to the existence of authorisation proofs
that authorise the use of those keys. While we can con-
ceive of systems in which IPMP tools obtain keys inde-
pendently of licences (such as ephemeral keys used to
protect streaming media, for example), this seemed to be
duplicating the work of licence distribution for the appli-
cations that we had in mind. Even if licences did not con-
tain the keys themselves, we expect that they could be
used to carry the information required to obtain the rele-
vant keys.
The general idea is that every licence that grants a right
must the contain the key required to exercise that right,
encrypted by the public key of the entity that is permitted
to exercise it. In this way, an authorisation proof forms a
chain of keys from the entity that is permitted to perform
an action, to the resource key that is required to access
the resource on which the action is permitted. Without a
valid authorisation proof rooted at a trusted actor, it is not
possible to recover the resource key. A similar concept
is used in Marlin, in which “nodes” take on the role of
“licences” here.
Every resource x is associated with a resource key kx.
This key is assumed to be chosen at random by the re-
source’s creator, and is only distributed in an encrypted
form as described here. Resource keys may be either sym-
metric or asymmetric.
Every grant that confers a right over a resource x must
contain kx encrypted according to an algorithm defined
by the principal of the grant. For the principal types that
we have implemented, the algorithms are:
K̄T
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Certificate
KeyHolder
PossessProperty
P
E(KT , K̄P )
Resource
Licence
PropertyPossessor
Play
idx
E(KP , kx) E(kx, x)
x
- -K̄P -kx
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Figure 7: Obtaining a resource key via an authorisation
proof.
KeyHolder. kx must be encrypted with the public key
of the terminal on which the grant is to be exercised.
Note this is not necessarily the same as the key sup-
plied in the KeyHolder element, which may refer
to a human principal rather than the terminal itself.
PropertyPossessor. Every property P is assumed
to be associated with a public and private key pair
(KP , K̄P ) and kx must be encrypted with KP .
Similar algorithms could be defined for other kinds of
principals.
In the system described by [32], for example, “mem-
bership certificates” award a property (that is, role) to a
human user at a particular terminal using a KeyHold-
er principal. “Resource licences” award the right to per-
form an action to a role using a PropertyPossessor
principal. An authorisation proof consists of a resource
licence together with a membership certificate, as shown
in Figure 7.
The resource licence contains the resource key kx en-
crypted by the public key of the property KP , and the
membership certificate contains the private key of the
property encrypted by the public key of the terminal KT .
Given a valid authorisation proof to access a resource, the
terminal can obtain the resource key by first decrypting
the role’s private key from the membership certificate,
then using this to decrypt the resource key from the re-
source licence.
Note. Since SITDRM assumes that anyone may is-
sue licences, a naı̈ve implementation of the foregoing
may allow dishonest users to construct apparently valid
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Figure 8: Using SITDRM for super-distribution.
licences for resources owned by other people. This can be
prevented by including a nonce in both licences and re-
sources, as described in the appendix of [32]. The nonce
enables a terminal to check that the licence and the re-
source were, in fact, constructed by the same person, ef-
fectively verifying that SITDRM’s root grant is satisfied.
6 SITDRM Applications
In addition to implementing the MPEG-21 IPMP Com-
ponents and Rights Expression Language as described in
the previous two sections, we implemented a collection
of IPMP tools sufficient to build several demonstration
applications. Each application is structured as a suite of
software linked against the core SITDRM library.
Our original application for SITDRM was the classical
copyright-protection application for which the MPEG-21
IPMP Components are intended (Figure 8). Multimedia
creators could distribute their creations as governed digi-
tal items using any convenient method. Users wishing to
access these items were then required to visit a web site
from which they could purchase a licence. The system
was later extended to allow users to transfer their licences
from device to device such that only one copy of the li-
cence was valid at any one time [25].
We later applied SITDRM to a privacy protection sce-
nario in which individuals could submit contact informa-
tion to a web site in the form of a governed digital item
(Figure 9) [32]. At the same time as they submitted their
information, individuals could create a licence that gave
permission to use that information only to the people who
filled particular roles within the organisation that received
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Figure 9: Using SITDRM for privacy protection.
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Figure 10: Using SITDRM for enterprise DRM.
the information. It is difficult to make MPEG REL acces-
sible to ordinary users, however, and the system was later
adapted to generate MPEG REL licences from P3P poli-
cies that could be rendered in a more familiar way [29].
Finally, we applied SITDRM to an enterprise DRM
scenario that allowed employees of an organisation to cre-
ate governed items that could only be read by other em-
ployees located within a particular area (Figure 10). Even
though a copy of the governed item could be taken any-
where on a mobile device, the IPMP engine refused per-
mission to access it unless the device could be located
within an approved region (typically, the organisation’s
offices).
We used the same security architecture and IPMP tools
for all of the above applications though not all aspects of
the architecture are present in all of the applications. In
the remainder of this section, we will describe the par-
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ticular security architecture and IPMP tools used in our
applications.
6.1 Security Architecture
This section outlines the cryptographic architecture used
in SITDRM. It is broadly similar to that used in other
digital rights management systems, with some straight-
forward additions to cope with the particular structure of
MPEG-21 and the trust management architecture of our
applications.
SITDRM uses the well-known RSA algorithm for all
public key cryptography, AES for all symmetric key cryp-
tography, and SHA-1 for all cryptographic hashes. Other
algorithms could be substituted for these without affecting
the structure of the system.
6.1.1 Secure Environments and Terminals
The fundamental requirement for the system to be secure
is that there exist tamper-resistant secure environments
(computer systems) whose configuration can be attested
to in the fashion of the Trusted Computing Group’s spec-
ifications [35]. Every particular instance of a secure envi-
ronment E is assumed to have a public key KE and cor-
responding private key K̄E such that the public key can
be verified using some public key infrastructure and the
private key is known only to the environment.
A secure environment may host one or more terminals
that form the fundamental unit of trust in the SITDRM
framework. All authorisation proofs must be rooted in a
grant awarded to a terminal whose configuration has been
attested to by a trusted secure environment.
In our applications, the “terminal” is a software pro-
cess executing in a secure environment, but in principle
it may also be a hardware device. Each terminal is as-
sumed to be isolated from any other processes executing
in the same environment, including the operating system
and other terminals. More detail can be found in [33].
The secure environment assigns a public key KT to ev-
ery terminal T that it hosts. The corresponding private
key K̄T will only be released to the terminal if it is in the
same configuration as it was when the key was created.
The terminal can attest to being in this configuration us-
ing the attestation feature of the secure environment.
6.1.2 Users and Roles
Every human user U (whether they are information cre-
ators or information users) of the system is assumed to
possess a public key KU and corresponding private key
K̄U such that the public key can be verified by some pub-
lic key infrastructure, and the private key is accessible
only to the user1. This key pair is used purely for iden-
tifying the users – e.g. as a KeyHolder principal – and
signing licences; it is not used for protecting resource keys
since human users are not necessarily trusted to abide by
the terms of licences.
Roles are represented as “properties” in MPEG REL,
that is, membership of a role R is expressed as the pos-
session of a property PR using the PossessProperty
right. Every role R is associated with a public key KR
and private key K̄R such that the public key can be veri-
fied by some public key infrastructure and the private key
is known only to the security officer responsible for as-
signing people to roles.
SITDRM does not explicitly support termination of a
user’s role membership, though it is possible to limit the
duration of a user’s role membership using the Valid-
ityInterval condition. MPEG REL supports revoca-
tion via the RevocationFreshness condition, which
obliges the IPMP engine to check whether or not the li-
cence has been revoked before permitting the action to
proceed. We have not yet implemented a condition vali-
dation tool for this condition, however.
6.1.3 Resource Keys
There are two kinds of resources in the existing SITDRM
applications: multimedia resources and properties (roles).
For properties, the resource key is the private key of the
role so that a terminal that possesses a valid licence to use
that role may access information encrypted for that role,
as described in Section 5.3.
The resource key for multimedia items is a symmetric
key, and in general it can be chosen at random. In our
applications, however, it was convenient to make the re-
source key to be a one-way function of the item’s identi-
1Technically, the terminal will only allow the private key to be used
if it is satisfied that the key’s owner is logged in using a password or
similar, since we cannot expect human users to compute cryptographic
functions themselves.
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fier idx and the item’s owner’s master key KU :
kx = HMAC(KU , idx).
This allows the same resource key to be generated at mul-
tiple sites by sharing the master key. This was particularly
useful in the copyright protection application in which we
had governed items being created by a packaging applica-
tion and licences for those items being generated at some
future date by a web site.
6.1.4 Security Argument
The structure of authorisation proofs varies from appli-
cation to application, but the fundamental requirement is
that licences be issued only to properties or terminals that
are trusted by the issuer. The resource key is encrypted by
the public key of that property or terminal, as described in
Section 5.3.
Trust in properties must be established using some out-
of-band mechanism; it amounts to trusting the person
responsible for managing a property. In particular, it
amounts to trusting that person to issue the property only
to terminals or other properties that are entitled to possess
the property.
Trust in terminals is established via the secure environ-
ment that executes them. Once trust in the secure environ-
ment has been established using the mechanism specified
by the designers of that environment, the environment can
vouch for the configuration and public key of terminals
executing on it. If the configuration is acceptable to the
issuer, the issuer can safely issue a licence to that termi-
nal.
An argument for the security of the system can be
mounted by induction on the authorisation proof. The
base case is satisfied if every authorisation proof is rooted
at a trusted terminal as required above. The inductive hy-
pothesis requires that a key in a grant only be accessible
to the entity to which that grant has been awarded. This is
true for the algorithms we described in Section 5.3.
6.2 IPMP Tools
6.2.1 Navigation Tools
Our current implementation supports only one navigation
tool, in which the Contents child of a governed ele-
ment contains the protected document tree encrypted us-
ing the XML Encryption specification, as shown in Fig-
ure 2. Once the tool is supplied with the key required
to access the protected document, it decrypts the docu-
ment into memory and acts as a wrapper around the Doc-
ument Object Model for that tree. This tool is similar to
the “fixed DRM tools” used in the Digital Media Project’s
specification.
6.2.2 Principal Validation Tools
Our current implementation supports two kinds of princi-
pal:
• the KeyHolder principal validation tool checks
that the user logged in at the terminal possesses the
private key corresponding to the public key supplied
within the KeyHolder element; and
• the PropertyPossessor principal validation
tool checks that the terminal has a valid licence
granting the PossessProperty right over the
property URI supplied within the PropertyPos-
sessor element. Properties are used for imple-
menting roles in the sense of role-based access con-
trol.
6.2.3 Condition Validation Tools
MPEG REL supports a very large number of conditions,
and we have only implemented those that have been use-
ful in the specific applications to which we have applied
SITDRM, including:
• the ValidityInterval condition checks that
the current time (as reported by a secure clock) falls
within a given interval;
• the Territory condition checks that the terminal
is located in a particular geographic location;
• the ContactMethods condition checks that a par-
ticular mode of communication (telephone, e-mail,
etc.) is in use for a Contact right [32]; and
• the AllConditions condition acts as a container
for an arbitrary collection of other conditions, all of
which must be satisfied.
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6.2.4 Resource Access Tools
Our current implementation supports only one resource
access tool, in which the resource is encrypted as a whole
using the AES cipher.
7 Discussion
7.1 Configuration-Driven vs. Full-Format
Inter-operability
MPEG-21’s approach to inter-operability in its IPMP
Components differs markedly from the approach taken
in the Rights Expression Language and Rights Data Dic-
tionary. In the latter two parts, MPEG-21 exhaustively
defines a detailed language and vocabulary that is sup-
posed to encompass all rights management, while in the
former MPEG-21 has avoided defining anything at all. In
fact, the IPMP Components appear to resurrect problems
stemming from under-specification in the original MPEG-
4 IPMP specification.
While the IPMP Components appear to be geared to-
wards IPMP tools that perform primitive functions such as
encryption and watermarking, the specification does ex-
plicitly contemplate IPMP tools that implement “a com-
plete IPMP system”. This, taken together with MPEG
REL, arguably lacks modularity: if we take “complete
IPMP systems” to mean systems such as OMA DRM and
Marlin, such systems may bring their own rights expres-
sion languages with them.
SITDRM binds the IPMP Components to the Rights
Expression Language, both in the way IPMP tools are
defined and in the way cryptographic information is dis-
tributed. Binding licences and cryptographic information
is consistent with the way other digital rights manage-
ment systems work, while binding the definition of IPMP
tools to MPEG REL removes the possibility for tools to
introduce a third-party language. SITDRM’s approach is
arguably rather elaborate compared to a monolothic ap-
proach, though it does have some advantages outlined in
the next section.
7.2 “GURMS”
All of the published specifications for digital rights man-
agement systems, including those from MPEG, the Open
Mobile Alliance, Marlin and the Digital Media Project,
focus exclusively on copyright protection. This is un-
derstandable given the background and aims of the bod-
ies that produced these specifications, and the clear need
for inter-operability in existing copyright-sensitive appli-
cations.
With digital rights management also being applicable
to sensitive corporate information and individuals’ private
information, however, we might wonder if a “grand uni-
fied rights management system” covering all of these ap-
plications is possible or appropriate. Microsoft, in fact,
has been reported to be moving in this direction with its
Windows Rights Management Services product [10].
SITDRM was originally designed for a copyright pro-
tection scenario of the kind contemplated by MPEG
and others, and later adapted to privacy and enterprise
DRM. The user-level applications changed from project
to project, but the core digital rights management func-
tions described in the present paper have remained con-
stant throughout all of the projects. While we needed
to introduce new rights and conditions to MPEG REL to
cater for privacy scenarios, we haven’t modified the cryp-
tographic architecture of the system, or the structure of the
digital item declaration or rights expression languages.
Inter-operability between privacy protection systems
and enterprise DRM systems has obvious benefits simi-
lar to those in copyright protection, and our experience
suggests that a grand unified rights management system
might be practical, whether it is based on the MPEG spec-
ification or another.
One unanticipated advantage of the use of rights en-
forcement tools in SITDRM is that the core REL inter-
preter did not need to be modified in order to introduce
new rights and conditions when we applied it to scenar-
ios that weren’t considered in the design of MPEG REL.
This demonstrates some of the value of layered architec-
tures compared to the traditional monolithic architectures.
The main point of contention here is whether or not
we should introduce a “purpose” component to the rights
expression language, as used in privacy protection lan-
guages such as P3P [36] and EPAL [30]. The concept
of a “purpose” may also be useful in copyright protection
– notably in the context of fair dealing exceptions in the
copyright law of countries such as the UK and Australia,
which allow copying for certain purposes such as educa-
tion and news reporting.
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It would be simple enough to add a Purpose element
to MPEG REL, but SITDRM chose to treat “purpose” as
being a kind of condition: “Alice may telephone Bob’s
number on the condition that her purpose is to renew his
insurance”, for example. Since the licence evaluator can
only check a “purpose” in so far as it can be described
as a logical condition subject to computer reasoning, this
approach seemed appropriate.
It should be noted, however, that the number of scenar-
ios to which we have so far applied SITDRM is relatively
small: generally, one or two scenarios from each of copy-
right protection, privacy protection and enterprise DRM.
It remains to be seen how SITDRM’s approach works
with more exotic conditions such as Prerequisite-
Right or more complex licensing schemes.
7.3 On KeyHolder Principals
SITDRM’s approach to resource key encryption for the
KeyHolder principal is arguably anomalous and con-
fusing, since it has the principal being associated with
one key (the human user’s) but the resource key being en-
crypted by an another key (the terminal’s). The algorithm
for the PropertyPossessor principal is much more
straightforward in that the resource key is encrypted by
the public key of the principal.
SITDRM’s KeyHolder principal comes about be-
cause MPEG REL allows key holders to be humans, but
the security of the system demands that resource keys be
inaccessible to humans. The algorithm would be more
straightforward if the KeyHolder principal referred to
the terminal, so that the resource key could be encrypted
with the public key of the principal as for the Proper-
tyPossessor principal.
This approach would require human users to be repre-
sented in some other way, for example, by representing
them as a property that could be possessed by all of the
terminals that they own, as in the “personal entertainment
domain” of Koster, et al. [24]. While this may make li-
censing appear more complicated, it arguably leads to a
more elegant security architecture.
7.4 Future Work
7.4.1 Tool Distribution and Authentication
IPDoc currently requires IPMP tools to be installed manu-
ally, and does not support mutual authentication between
tools and terminals. MPEG’s intention is that tools be
installed automatically and transparently as they are re-
quired, and mutual authentication is necessary for the sys-
tem to be secure.
Automatic detection and installation of plug-ins is al-
ready supported by popular web browsers and it seems
unlikely that implementing a similar feature for IPMP
tools in a digital rights management terminal would
present any unusual challenges apart from the need for
mutual authentication.
While cryptographic mechanisms for mutual authenti-
cation are well-known, constructing an effective tool au-
thentication architecture may be a significant challenge.
An effective architecture must support
• a very large installed base of terminals and tools pro-
vided by many different manufacturers;
• tools and terminals that run on many different com-
puting platforms; and
• revocation and renewal for tools and terminals that
have been compromised.
7.4.2 Efficient Authorisation Proofs
Our current authorisation proof builder – and the others
of which we are aware – have three major weaknesses in
terms of efficiency.
First, many grants contain conditions that cannot be sat-
isfied by the terminal, for example, because they require
other grants to exist that do not or because they have ex-
hausted some stateful condition. In a few cases, the IPMP
engine can eliminate these when constructing an authori-
sation proof, but in most cases it cannot eliminate them
until it attempts to execute the condition validation tool.
This leads the IPMP engine to produce unusable authori-
sation “proofs” that users have to eliminate manually.
Second, the IPDoc terminal has menu options for many
different actions but only a few of them might be permit-
ted on any particular resource. Applications typically dis-
able unusable menu items, but for IPDoc this would mean
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it had to execute the IPMP engine for every possible ac-
tion on its menu bar. This may be a very expensive oper-
ation for terminals that support a large number of actions.
Third, the licence pool may be distributed over a net-
work, with the result that the IPMP engine needs to be
constantly on-line and may generate large amounts of net-
work traffic. An improved proof-building algorithm may
be able to reduce the engine’s reliance on the network by
both reducing the number of queries that need to be made
in the first place, and by caching the results of frequent
queries in a local licence pool.
Our IPMP engine is designed to be a generic engine
able to find an authorisation proof, if it exists, for any re-
quest over any pool of licences. If we look at the particular
applications that use the IPMP engine, however, it is of-
ten easy to see much more efficient methods of producing
valid authorisation proofs since these applications have a
particular structure to their authorisation proofs. Ideally,
we would like our applications to be able to communicate
“hints” to the IPMP engine that allowed it to take advan-
tage of application-specific knowledge without having to
write a specialised proof builder for every application.
8 Conclusion
The MPEG-21 Intellectual Property Management and
Protection Components provide the skeleton of a
configuration-driven inter-operable digital rights manage-
ment system, but do not specify an interface to IPMP
tools. SITDRM defines an interface that binds tools to
the MPEG Rights Expression Language, and provides
a generic digital rights management framework that has
been applied to scenarios in copyright protection, privacy
protection and enterprise DRM.
The principal advantage of SITDRM’s tool interface is
that it allows a skeleton MPEG REL interpreter to be eas-
ily extended to support the set of principals, rights, re-
sources and conditions appropriate to a particular appli-
cation area. This architecture allowed us to apply the
MPEG-21 IPMP components to a variety of scenarios
without needing to build a monolithic universal MPEG
REL interpreter.
SITDRM is not a complete system, however, and lacks
some of the trust infrastructure that would need to be
supported by a fully-functional digital rights management
platform. Furthermore, the efficiency and usability of its
IPMP engine could be greatly improved if it were able
to take advantage of application-specific knowledge about
the structure of authorisation proofs. We leave this as fu-
ture work.
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A SITDRM IPMP Tool API
SITDRM requires that IPMP tools implement a Java inter-
face summarised in this appendix. The technical details of
the classes used have been omitted for ease of exposition.
SITDRM is an on-going project and the interface de-
scribed here is unlikely to be final or complete. We have
not yet defined any mutual authentication methods, for
example, and future condition and principal implementa-
tions may require the IPMPToolListener interface to
be expanded in order to supply more information about
the tool’s environment.
A.1 IPMPToolListener
The IPMPToolListener interface is implemented by
the IPMP engine and provides call-back methods by
which IPMP tools can gain information about the envi-
ronment in which they are running and about the action
that they have been instantiated to govern (referred to as
“the action” below).
decrypt(t, m)
Ask the terminal or principal to decrypt a message.
t – the terminal or principal
m – the message to decrypt
forceEndGovernedAction()
Forcibly end the action.
getChoice(m, t, c, i)
Get a choice from the user.
m – the question to ask the user
t – the title for the dialogue box
c – the list of choices
i – the default choice
getConditionValidationTool()
Get the condition validation tool that is governing
the action.
getGrant(p, r, a)
Search for a grant with a particular principal,
resource and right.
p – the principal
r – the resource
a – the right
getKeyInfo()
Get the key information from the grant that
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authorised the action.
getMeansUri()
Get the means being used to carry out the action.
getPrincipalValidationTool()
Get the principal validation tool that is governing
the action.
getSessionId()
Get the session in which the action is occurring.
getTaskUri()
Get the task to be carried out by the action.
showMessage(m, t)
Display a message to the user.
m – the message
t – the title for the dialogue box
A.2 IPMPTool
The IPMPTool interface must be implemented by all
IPMP tools. The tool is configured once at the time it
is instantiated, then notified every time a new action be-
gins. In a complete implementation, this interface would
also include mutual authentication functions.
configure(e, t, l)
Configure the tool for use.
e – the secure environment
t – the terminal’s identifier
l – the IPMPToolListener
init()
Initialise the tool for a new action.
A.3 IPMPNavigationTool
The IPMPNavigationTool interface allows the
DIDL parser to navigate a governed element as if it were
an ungoverned element. To this end, its interface is based
very closely on the Node interface of the Document Ob-
ject Model. Other aspects of the Node interface could be
implemented but we have not needed them in our applica-
tions.
appendChild(p, c)
Append a child node to a parent node.
p – the parent node
c – the child node
getFirstChild(p)
Get the first child of a node.
p – the parent node
removeChild(p, c)
Remove a child node from a parent node.
p – the parent node
c – the child node
replaceChild(p, n, o)
Replace a child node of a parent node.
p – the parent node
n – the new child node
o – the child node to replace
A.4 IPMPPrincipalValidationTool
The IPMPPrincipalValidationTool interface al-
lows the IPMP engine to authenticate the principal of a
grant.
endAction(f)
Called at the completion of an action.
f – success flag
validatePrincipal()
Attempt to authenticate the principal.
A.5 IPMPConditionValidationTool
The IPMPConditionValidationTool interface al-
lows the IPMP engine to evaluate the condition of a grant.
It is the tool’s responsibility to update any state informa-
tion associated with the condition when the endAction
method is called.
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beginAction()
Called at the beginning of an action to evaluate the condition.
endAction(f)
Called at the completion of an action.
f – success flag
A.6 IPMPResourceAccessTool
The IPMPResourceAccessTool interface allows the
IPMP engine to engine to create an instance of the Java
InputStream class that reads a governed resource as if
it were the equivalent ungoverned one. The tool obtains
the key required to decrypt the resource by querying the
IPMP engine for the key information in the grant that ap-
proves access to the resource.
createFilterInputStream(s)
Create an InputStream that performs any decryption, etc.
required to access the resource.
s – the InputStream connected to the raw resource
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